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Introduction
Performance management in public administration has had 
a long ascent, and in all probability, has a long road ahead. 
Nonetheless, performance management is not without its 
problems.  Practitioners,  management  consultants  as  well 
as  academics  have  sought  solutions  in  response  to  the 
paradoxical and often problematic nature of performance 
management. Based on recent performance literature, this 
contribution  tries  to  identify  some  emerging  issues  for 
performance management improvement. 
  The article first outlines some paradoxes in public sector 
performance  measurement  and  management,  which  at 
the same time echoes some of the main challenges. Next, 
Argyris  &  Schön’s  (1996)  distinction  between  single  and 
double loop learning will be used to categorise the character 
of the proposals, which may stimulate a strategic reflection 
on  where  to  go  with  performance  measurement  and 
management. Single loop solutions suggest mitigating the 
implementation  problems  of  performance  management. 
The main argument is that better results in performance 
management can be obtained by better implementation. 
The  message  is ‘to  have  a  second  go’  with  an  essentially 
good  system.  A  second  cluster  of  responses,  the  double   
loop, proposes to change (parts of) the system itself. Here, 
the message is not just to try it again, but to do it differently. 
In  complex  and  ambiguous  contexts,  the  double  loop 
proposals have the highest potential to improve the added 
value of performance management. Alongside the learning 
approaches,  the  article  stipulates  some  new  ways  of 
improving performance management in the public sector.
Paradoxes in performance measurement and management 
NPM  reforms  worldwide  have  introduced  a  variety  of 
performance  measurement  and  management  practices. 
Performance  management  has  gradually  become  an 
integral part of modern governance arrangements (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert 2004). In recent years, evaluative research has 
uncovered some paradoxes in the current practice. 
Counting the uncountable 
Albert  Einstein’s  office  at  Princeton  University  had  a  sign 
stating, ‘Not everything that counts can be counted, and 
not  everything  that  can  be  counted  counts’.  Sometimes 
this insight is forgotten. Managers and politicians inferred 
13
Paradoxes of improving 
performance management 
(systems) in public administration
Dr Wouter van Dooren* and Nick Thijs**
New public management set off a new wave of performance management efforts in government. 
Recent performance literature has documented the shortcomings of performance management 
and provided recommendations on how to improve it. This emerging issues’ contribution revisits 
this literature and makes a distinction between recommendations for better implementation 
of  what  are  seen  as  essentially  good  systems  (single  loop  learning)  on  the  one  hand,  and 
recommendations that target the performance management systems themselves (double loop 
learning) on the other. It is argued that in complex settings, performance management may benefit 
from new ways of carrying out performance management. It is suggested that performance 
management needs to be more agile, more decentralised and more political. 
P
a
r
a
d
o
x
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
tfrom  the  conviction  that  what  gets  measured,  gets  done 
that  what  does  not  get  measured,  does  not  get  done. 
This  incorrect  logical  inference  was  reinforced  by 
management  consultants  advocating  the  quest  for  the 
ultimate  set  of  Key  Performance  Indicators  (KPIs).  Many 
employees deduced that services not subjected to a KPI are 
not that important – they are no ‘key performances’ after 
all. It is not uncommon for divisions in large organisations 
to lobby to get their activities into the KPI set (Van Dooren 
2006). They know; what is counted, counts. 
  The  last  decade,  several  performance  management 
experts have pleaded for a focus on measuring outcomes 
instead of outputs or processes (Hatry 2002; Perrin 2003). 
The argument is that only outcomes are ‘real’ key results, i.e. 
results that matter for society. It does not matter how many 
police patrols are negotiating the streets (which is an output); 
citizens  want  safety  (which  is  an  outcome).  Therefore, 
performance  measurement  should  primarily  focus  on 
outcomes. Yet, and therein lies the paradox, outcomes are 
in many instances very hard to count. We know that what 
is measured gets attention, but we also know that many 
important dimensions are immeasurable. 
Distrusting professionals, but relying on them 
Performance  management  doctrine  has  an  ambiguous 
attitude towards expertise and professionals. On the one 
hand, professionals are the key to better performance. In fact, 
the NPM phrase ‘let managers manage’ reflects confidence 
in the professionalism of managers (Kettl 1997). Similarly, 
it  is  expected  that  managers 
are entrepreneurs and leaders 
that bring about the best in the 
staff  under  their  supervision. 
Not in a command and control 
style,  but  by  empowerment 
(Osborne  and  Gaebler  1993). 
On  the  other  hand,  per-
formance  management  systems  often  express  a  certain 
amount  of  distrust  in  professionals.  Davies  and  Lampel 
(1998), assessing performance management in the British 
National  Health  Service,  argue  that  managers  primarily 
used  performance  information  in  a  tactical  way,  in  order 
to  intervene  in  the  doctor-patient  relationship.  Hence,  a 
plethora of indicators has been developed to counterbalance 
doctors’ professional knowledge. Radin (2006) provides the 
example of the British Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) 
which audited the research quality of universities based on a 
number of performance indicators such as the number and 
type of publications. Rather than trusting the professional 
researcher,  quality  is  counted.  Similarly,  Radin  points  to 
the No Child Left Behind initiative in public schools in the 
USA. She asserts that the most vigorous critique was on the 
standardised tests that allegedly did not leave enough room 
for teachers’ discretion. 
  There  is  a  clear  paradox.  On  the  one  hand,  trust  in 
professionalism is vital in an increasingly complex society. 
On the other hand, we are reluctant to grant this trust and 
hence we fall back on control and audit. According to Power 
(1999) these audits are to a large extent ceremonial – he 
speaks  of “rituals  of  verification”.  Many  audits  are  mainly 
about creating an illusion of control. Similar arguments can 
be made for other performance measurement initiatives in 
both public and private sectors (Van de Walle and Roberts 
2008). 
Paralysis by analysis 
Decision  makers  have  to  process  a  lot  of  information; 
budgets,  audits,  impact  analyses,  evaluation  studies, 
memoranda  from  interest  groups,  laws  and  jurisdiction, 
personal  communication,  etc…  An  almost  superhuman 
analytical capacity is required to process all these sources. 
Performance information comes on top of this pile, and for 
this reason, the risk of an information overload increases 
even more. Although performance management is devised 
to improve decisions, it may well lead to paralysis. It should 
thus  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  practitioners  consider 
selectivity in measurement to be one of the key challenges 
for implementing performance management (Mayne 2007). 
If everyone is accountable, no-one is
There  is  increasing  awareness  that  public  organisations 
cannot be effective on their own. A considerable amount of 
literature on collaboration, partnerships, and networks has 
developed (see for instance Mandell and Keast 2008). As a 
result of collaboration, the responsibilities for performance 
are  shared  as  well.  Hence,  when  many  organisations 
participate,  it  becomes  more  difficult  to  hold  a  single 
organisation  accountable  for  results.  And  if  many  are 
accountable, the risk occurs that no one takes responsibility 
for failure and everybody for success. 
  Should  we  then  stick  to  traditional  accountability 
schemes with one principal and one agent? Probably not. 
The  willingness  to  collaborate  can  erode  when  single 
accountability  schemes  are  maintained.  Aristigueta  & 
Denhardt (2008) demonstrated 
that  typical  approaches  to 
performance management are 
impacting  partnerships  and 
collaborations.  Performance-
based  accountability  systems 
tend  to  undermine  colla-
borative efforts unless they are 
accompanied by other strategies for providing an impetus 
for alignment and collaboration across agencies. 
Single loop learning - better implementation 
The  usual  response  to  the  paradoxes  of  performance 
management  is  to  improve  implementation. This  can  be 
categorised as single loop learning, the basic premises of 
performance  management  are  not  called  into  question.   
The  idea  is  that  if  only  we  try  harder,  performance 
management will improve. In what follows, four strategies 
for better implementation of performance management will 
be discussed. 
Improve the quality of performance information 
A first strategy is to improve the quality of the information. 
The attention paid by organisations to quality issues is not 
always evident. Research suggests that often only modest 
attention is paid to quality assurance practices in the area 
of performance measurement (Mayne 2007). Nonetheless, 
Hatry (2008) argues that investment in the many dimensions 
of quality can ratchet up the use of performance information. 
He  mentions  validity,  accuracy,  timeliness,  analysis  and 
presentation as some important quality dimensions. Clear 
and timely presentation of performance information may 
remedy  the  information  overload  of  decision  makers. 
Professionals  may  trust  performance  information  more 
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Not everything that counts 
can be counted, 
and not everything that 
can be counted countswhen validity and accuracy increases. Better analysis may 
help to focus performance management on what matters 
and to single out accountability issues. 
  Quality of performance information alone however does 
not guarantee the use of performance information. As we 
argued  above,  performance  information  competes  with 
other sources of information for decision-makers’ attention. 
Moreover, research on gaming has revealed that on several 
occasions information is selected because it fits into a pre-
determined agenda and not because it is intrinsically good 
(Perrin 1998). Yet, it should be clear that in such a context, 
quality improvements will not help to overcome issues such as 
disputes about accountability or resistance from professionals. 
Leadership 
An  OECD  survey  (Curristine  2005)  found  that  strong 
leadership (also politically) is key in explaining the success 
of performance management. Someone has to put his or 
her shoulders under a performance management effort and 
develop  a  measurement  strategy.  Preferably,  this  person 
carries some weight. Good leadership may be a response 
to these paradoxes, because it takes the uncountable into 
account, quickly identifies core bits of information, motivates 
professionals and holds people to account in a fair way. 
 
However, leadership as a concept is ill-specified, and hence 
the interpretation of the OECD findings is more complicated. 
In particular in survey research such as the OECD’s, there 
is  the  risk  that  respondents  use  leadership as  a  quick  fix 
when  they  cannot  point  to  more  precise  factors.  Hence, 
better implementation through better leadership is not a 
very  actionable  recommendation. The  issue  of  leadership 
certainly  raises  a  host  of  secondary  questions  (Van  Wart 
2003); who should the leader be? What traits are important 
for  performance  leadership?  Where  does  leadership  in 
performance come from and how can it be sustained? What 
should these leaders do in which circumstances? Thus it does 
not suffice to state that better performance management 
depends on better leadership. We also need to make clear 
what it is and what leaders need to do. 
Ownership 
Another  somewhat  magical  word  in  the  management 
discourse  is  ownership.  Implementation  failures  are 
regularly said to be caused by a lack of it. Mayne (2007) for 
instance notes that a system built on filling in performance 
information forms for others, with no apparent use for those 
down  the  line,  is  unlikely  to  be  robust  and  survive  over 
time. Better implementation of performance measurement 
and management requires that those who are affected by 
the system have to accept and internalise the system (Van 
Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan 2010). 
  In a thrust to assure ownership, performance management 
reforms often fall victim of over-commitment (Pollitt 2008). 
Many people need to be convinced in order to introduce 
a  performance  management  system;  politicians,  top  and 
middle  managers,  professionals  and  front  line  workers, 
to  name  a  few.  Hence,  an  understandable  strategy  is  to 
create  high  expectations  and  to  play  down  the  costs.   
Yet, although this strategy may prove successful in the short 
term,  it  almost  definitely  will  boomerang  in  the  medium 
term. Typically, costs of a performance management system 
are tangible and become apparent relatively shortly after 
the introduction of the system. Benefits on the other hand 
are  intangible  and  may  only  appear  in  the  longer  term. 
Disillusionment with performance systems that do not (yet) 
deliver may undermine confidence and therefore the failure 
of the performance management effort may become a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Ownership strategies are hence relatively 
fragile. It takes much more effort to build acceptance of a 
performance management system than to lose it. 
Variations of integration 
Integration,  coordination,  formalisation,  consistency, 
coherence,  routine-building,  and  alignment  are  some 
of  the  most  common  key  words  for  those  who  want  to 
fix  performance  management  without  questioning  its 
blueprint.  Although  the  importance  of  integration  and 
coordination is undeniable, we should also acknowledge its 
limitations. Complexity and change regularly tear carefully 
coordinated  systems  apart.  The  desire  to  coordinate  all 
efforts in advance may lead to delay and even deadlock.   
In some instances, it may make more sense to remedy on the 
consequences of ill-coordinated performance efforts than 
to  embark  on  excessively  ambitious  coordination  efforts   
(see for instance Laegreid, Roness, and Rubecksen 2008). 
Double loop learning – new ways of doing performance 
management 
The  previous  section  suggested  four  strategies  for 
better  implementation.  Although  they  may  substantially 
mitigate the paradoxes identified in the first section, also 
some  limitations  were  pointed  out.  Recent  research  on 
performance  management  however  also  suggests  new 
ways  of  doing  performance  management.  Not  only  in 
theory,  but  also  in  practice  some  of  these  new  ways  are 
emerging  (see  for  instance  Abramson  and  Behn  2006).   
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  dig  deeper  into  these 
proposals.  Firstly  by  arguing  that  the  main  challenge  of 
performance  management  lies  in  making  it  “ambiguity-
proof”. Secondly, in proposing more concrete implications of 
this argument. 
Making performance management ambiguity-proof 
The  context  of  public  administration  is  complex  and 
ambiguous.  Kravchuk  &  Schack  (1996)  explain  what 
complexity  means;  indeterminate  objective  functions, 
multiple  administrative  layers,  collective  action  problems, 
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increasing scope and scale of operations. There are many 
sources  of  ambiguity:  history  (what  has  happened?), 
intentions (what must be done?), technology (what can be 
done?) and participation (who is present?). Noordegraaf & 
Abma (2003) add that current performance management, 
which they label as management by measurement, only fits 
the rare unambiguous contexts. Defined as such, not many 
unambiguous situations will be found. Since ambiguity is 
everywhere, the prospects for performance management in 
this view are rather limited. 
  An alternative to giving up 
on performance management 
is to rethink it in order to make it 
‘ambiguity-proof’. This can only 
be done by taking complexity 
and  ambiguity  as  a  given,  and  changing  the  practice  of 
performance management on this foundation. Along these 
lines, Radin (2006: p. 241-242) argues that many problems 
with performance measurement and management can be 
attributed  to  faulty  points  of  departure.  She  argues  that 
intelligence is not based on universal principles and literal 
meanings. Rather, multiple sources, situational knowledge 
and literal and symbolic meanings are important in making 
sense. It should also not be assumed that values, politics and 
conflict are not at play in performance management. They 
clearly are. Finally, the assumption of linear causes and effect 
relations, clear goals and planned change does not survive 
the reality check. On the contrary, Radin paints a picture of 
complexity, interdependence and unplanned change. 
Implications;  performance  management  needs  to  be 
agile, decentralised and political 
What  would  such  an  ambiguity-proof  performance 
management system look like? Three features are discussed 
below; performance management needs to be (a) agile, (b) 
close to the action, and (c) political. 
A. Performance measurement needs to be agile – use PIs for 
learning rather than accountability
Kravchuck and Schack (1996) refer to Ashby, a cybernetics 
scholar,  who  posited  that  only  complexity  can  absorb 
complexity.  Rigid  information  systems  will  not  be  able 
to  apprehend  and  to  understand  rising  complexity  in 
the  environment.  In  the  most  extreme  cases,  chaos  will 
appear to reign due to the ever increasing gap between 
practical experience and the knowledge base as provided 
by the information system. Information (what we believe 
to know) and practice (what we experience) risk becoming 
separated worlds; one orderly, where objectives are set and 
performance targets are reached, and one chaotic, where 
people are mainly trying to muddle through the day. 
  The  main  implication  would  be  that  performance 
indicators (PIs) should be used for learning, and less so for 
accountability (see also (Delancer Julnes 2008)). PI based 
accountability  requires  stability  for  the  period  for  which 
targets are set. Yet, not many fields remain stable for three 
to  six  years.  Research  in  New  Zealand  has  demonstrated 
the difficulties of maintaining stability in an indicator set. 
As  a  result,  accountability  erodes  accordingly  (Gregory 
and  Lonti  2008).  In  addition  to  stability,  accountability 
requires relatively univocal PIs that do not allow for much 
interpretation. PIs have to be an accurate representation of 
‘real’ performance. Unlike accountability, learning does not 
require the same stability and robustness. On the contrary, 
performance measurement is part of a permanent dialogue 
in  order  to  make  sense  of  complexity  (Moynihan  2008). 
Hence, indicators can and should be adjusted in response to 
contextual changes and new insights. 
  This  proposal  does  not  suggest  that  managers  and 
professionals should not be accountable for performance. 
It only suggests that accountability through performance 
indicators  is  probably  not  compatible  with  the  need  to 
have agile measurement systems. Accountability however 
does not solely depend on PIs. 
Performance  assessment  can 
be  qualitative,  quantitative 
or  both.  In  a  complex 
environment,  it  might  make 
more sense to hold managers 
accountable  for,  amongst  other  things,  the  way  they 
facilitate learning from performance indicators, rather than 
the performance indicators themselves. 
B. Performance management needs to be close to the action- 
guerrilla tactics and decentralisation 
Organisations typically have an undercurrent of repeated 
decisions  they  have  to  make.  To  these  recurrent  cycles, 
a  constant  stream  of  unique  one-off  decisions  is  added. 
In  recent  decades,  the  relative  importance  of  the  stable, 
recurrent  processes  has  decreased.  Kettl  (2002)  argues 
that the traditional U.S. public administration boundaries 
of  mission,  resources,  capacity,  responsibility  and 
accountability must be managed in an increasingly complex 
and political context, necessitating additional negotiation 
and  collaboration  between  systems  and  agencies.  These 
complex parallel processes are in a unique way shaped by 
situational requirements of time and place (Pollitt 2008). 
  Recurrent financial, HRM and contract cycles have been 
the main vehicle for incorporating performance information 
in  decision  making  (Bouckaert  and  Halligan  2008). 
Without a doubt, these cycles will remain the foundation 
of  performance  management  in  the  future  as  well.  Yet, 
top  down  performance  management  on  a  yearly  (as  in 
the budget cycle) or monthly basis (as in many balanced 
scorecard systems) will need to be supplemented by flexible 
efforts  to  provide  performance  information  on  demand. 
Since complex, unique processes will gain importance, the 
timing  (when  is  performance  information  used)  and  the 
locus (where it is used) will be challenged. 
  With regard to the timing, performance management in 
complex contexts may need to resort to a kind of ‘guerrilla 
tactics’. In complex policy and management processes, the 
demand  for  performance  information  can  arise  relatively 
unexpectedly.  At  the  same  time,  demand  can  fade  away 
as  quickly  as  it  came  about.  In  such  a  context,  expert 
staff is needed to quickly infuse complex processes with 
performance information. Those performance information 
brokers need to be able to both capture the need for and 
understand the availability of performance information. 
  With  regard  to  the  locus,  performance  management 
in  complex  contexts  may  benefit  from  stronger 
decentralisation. Rather than devising top down systems, 
performance  management  needs  to  be  in  the  hands 
of  middle  managers  and  front-line  supervisors  who 
understand the situational requirements best. This strategy 
might  bring  about  the  capacity  of  public  managers  that 
Behn (2004) calls performance leadership. He opposes the 
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Performance information should 
primarily refocus political debate 
rather than curb it17
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performance  leadership  model  to  focus  on  performance 
systems and structures. He writes that ‘rather than develop 
public managers with the leadership capacity to improve 
the performance of their agencies, we have sought to create 
performance systems that will impose such improvements 
(p.3)’. The same reasoning can be applied within agencies. 
Middle  management  and  front-line  supervisors  need  the 
leadership capacity to improve performance. This includes 
drawing lessons from performance indicators. 
  For  performance  budgeting,  this  approach  would 
suggest  introducing  performance  information  into 
budget  negotiations  through  policy  networks  rather 
than systematically reporting performance in the budget 
document  that  is  voted  in  parliament.  Since  the  budget 
document is mainly an after-the-fact codification of political 
negotiations  that  have  taken  place  before,  performance 
budgets risk becoming a bureaucratic exercise. There is some 
evidence  supporting  the  effectiveness  of  this  approach. 
Bourdeaux (2008) for instance suggests that performance 
information mainly enters the legislative discourse through 
policy networks maintained by key committee staff, rather 
than  through  executive  budget  reports  and  requests. 
Some  confirmation  is  also  found  in  an  OECD  survey  on 
performance  budgeting  showing  that  countries  do  use 
performance  information  to  inform,  but  not  determine, 
budget  allocations  (Curristine  2005).  Furthermore,  this 
study argues that much ‘linking’ of these performance and 
financial information has been simply to provide them in 
the same report. A study of Melkers and Willoughby (2001) 
found that from a list of factors explaining the introduction 
of performance budgeting at state level, the improvement 
of  decision-making  was  most  important.  A  further  study 
at  local  and  county  level  found  the  strongest  usefulness 
of  measures  within  a  budget  cycle  to  be  during  budget 
development, with less importance as the budget process 
proceeds (Melkers and Willoughby 2005). 
C. Performance management needs to be political 
Some time ago, Innes (1990) observed that the only way to 
keep data-gathering out of politics is to collect irrelevant 
data.  Good  performance  information  should  strengthen 
the evidence base for solving the political problems of who 
gets what, when and how. Issues of who gets what, when 
and how are at play at all levels; in government-wide policy 
making, in policy sectors and networks, in organisational 
management,  and  in  micro-management.  Performance 
indicators  can  elevate  the  quality  of  political  discussions 
at all of these levels. It is not suggested that the political 
institutions (the executive, parliaments, parties, etc) have to 
interfere with all performance issues at all levels. Rather, we 
want to stress the importance of recognising the political 
nature of performance management. 
  A  first  implication  is  that  performance  management 
should involve more, rather than fewer actors. In complex 
settings, performance management is mainly about making 
sense. Hence, we can expect that performance management 
will have the highest impact when different perspectives are 
drawn into the dialogue. Obviously, the interests around the 
table have to relevant and the number of participants needs 
to be workable. 
  A second implication is that performance management 
should  deal  with  controversy  rather  than  suppress  it. 
Performance  information  should  not  be  an  authoritative 
argument  to  end  conflicting  views  on  who  should  get 
what, when and how. Rather, it should underpin a careful 
argumentation of  causes,  consequences,  and  priorities  in 
performance. It should bring controversy to a higher level 
of argument; more evidence based and more focussed on 
output and outcome. The assumption is that high quality 
dialogue  will  lead  to  improved  judgement  and  decision-
making. 
  The previous paragraphs dealt with the political nature 
of performance management, and not so much about the 
political institutions. There are efforts however to strengthen 
the role of performance information in the political system 
as well (Moynihan 2009; Bourdeaux 2008). Such initiatives 
will only be successful however when they acknowledge 
the  different  values  and  positions  that  political  players 
assume.  Performance  information  that  promises  to  end 
political debates, to get political argumentation out of the 
political system, is irrelevant at best, but potentially harmful. 
Disagreement is essential for the functioning of democracy 
and  therefore  performance  information  should  primarily 
refocus political debate rather than curb it. 
Conclusion 
New public management set off a new wave of performance 
management efforts in government. Recent performance 
literature has documented the shortcomings of performance 
management  and  provided  recommendations  on  how 
to  improve  it.  Some  of  these  recommendations  mainly 
prescribe  better  implementation  (single  loop  learning) 
while  others  suggest  new  ways  of  doing  performance 
management (double loop learning). In particular in complex 
and ambiguous contexts, performance management risks 
becoming  decoupled  from  practice  and  hence  irrelevant 
for  decision-making. Therefore,  new  ways  are  needed.  In 
order to make performance management ambiguity-proof, 
it may be useful to have more agile measurement systems, 
to manage performance close to the action, and to better 
appreciate the political nature of performance management. 
NOTES
*  Dr Wouter van Dooren, Lecturer, Department of political science,   
  Antwerp University, Belgium 
**  Nick Thijs, Lecturer, European Institute of Public Administration,   
  EIPA Maastricht. 18
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